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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal presents three issues on which we have not 
previously ruled in a precedential opinion.  First, whether an 
employee terminated from a local government position may 
maintain an action for age discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  Second, whether the pleading of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, must satisfy the standards established 
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  And third, whether a 
complainant’s submission of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s revised Intake Questionnaire 
constitutes the filing of a charge of discrimination. 
 
 As to the first question, we hold that a state or local 
government employee may not maintain an age 
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but must 
instead proceed under the ADEA.  As to the second question, 
we hold that a plaintiff is not obligated to plead exhaustion of 
administrative remedies with particularity, but may instead 
allege in general terms that the required administrative 
process has been completed.  And finally, we hold that the 
EEOC Intake Questionnaire, revised in the wake of Federal 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008), when 
properly completed, constitutes a charge of discrimination. 
 
 As a result of our holdings, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Appellant Anthony Hildebrand’s § 1983 
claims but we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of 
Hildebrand’s ADEA claim against the Allegheny County 
District Attorney’s Office as Hildebrand submitted a properly 
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completed Intake Questionnaire to the EEOC within the 
deadline for filing a charge of discrimination, and Hildebrand 
adequately pled the exhaustion of administrative remedies.  
Finally, we will affirm the dismissal of the ADEA claims 
against Appellee Allegheny County because it was not named 
on the Intake Questionnaire, and was not identified as a 
respondent to an age discrimination charge until after the 
deadline for filing a charge of discrimination against it had 
passed. 
 
I. Background 
 
Anthony Hildebrand was employed as a detective for 
the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s 
Office”) for five years before he was terminated on February 
18, 2011.  Prior to his work at the DA’s Office, Hildebrand 
spent fifteen years as an undercover narcotics detective with 
the Pittsburgh Police Department.   
 
 On February 18, 2011, Hildebrand received a letter 
suspending him without pay for five days pending discharge, 
and announcing his termination effective that day.  He filed 
an internal grievance, but the termination was ultimately 
upheld.    
 
 Hildebrand maintains that his termination was part of 
“a well-known and established practice to push out older 
workers through termination or forced resignation.”  
(Appellant’s Br. 5.)  He contends that he became a victim of 
age-based discrimination beginning in 2009 when he was 
assigned a new supervisor who, he asserts, demoted him 
because of his age despite his satisfactory work performance.  
As part of his demotion, Hildebrand states that he was 
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insulted on the basis of his age and relocated to an inferior 
workplace.  He further alleges that the discrimination he 
faced was part of a hostile work environment that transcended 
the conduct of any one employee.   
 
 On December 1, 2011, Hildebrand completed an 
Intake Questionnaire (“the Intake Questionnaire”) with the 
EEOC, indicating that he was the victim of discrimination on 
the basis of his age.  He also checked a box on the Intake 
Questionnaire authorizing the EEOC to investigate his claim 
and indicating that he “want[ed] to file a charge of 
discrimination.”  (EEOC Br. 3.)  Subsequently, on January 
11, 2012, Hildebrand completed a “Charge of 
Discrimination” with the EEOC, naming the Allegheny 
County District Attorney as the respondent.  The EEOC 
issued a right-to-sue letter on May 7, 2012, and Hildebrand 
filed suit on August 7, 2012.   
 
Hildebrand’s complaint named Allegheny County 
(“the County”), as well as the DA’s Office, as defendants.  
His complaint asserted violations of the ADEA, Title VII 
(retaliation), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (asserting violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause due to age-based discrimination, as 
well as violation of his First Amendment free speech rights),  
the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 
1421-1428, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 
Pa. Cons. Stat §§ 951-963.  His complaint also alleged: 
 
All conditions precedent to 
jurisdiction under section 706 of 
Title VII, have occurred or been 
complied with.  Plaintiff filed a 
claim of employment 
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discrimination with the [EEOC].  
The EEOC issued a Notice of 
Right to Sue.  This Complaint is 
filed within 90 days of such 
Notice of Right to Sue. 
 
(A. 2.)   
 
The County and the DA’s Office (collectively, 
“Appellees”) separately filed motions to dismiss.  On 
December 7, 2012, the District Court granted the motions to 
dismiss the Title VII retaliation claim.  The District Court 
also applied the pleading standards set forth in Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, to Hildebrand’s assertion 
that he satisfied all conditions precedent to filing suit under 
the ADEA. Analyzing Hildebrand’s complaint in light of the 
Iqbal/Twombly standard, the District Court stated:  
 
Because [the complaint] fails to 
provide any facts, i.e. specific 
dates, as to when Plaintiff raised 
his claim with the EEOC and 
when the EEOC issued its right to 
sue letter to Plaintiff, and because 
Plaintiff failed to attach his Right 
to Sue to the Complaint, . . . the 
Complaint falls short of providing 
the facts to establish whether he 
has adequately exhausted his 
administrative remedies. 
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 (A. 112.)  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the ADEA claim 
without prejudice.  The District Court also dismissed 
Hildebrand’s section 1983 claims without prejudice.   
 
 Hildebrand filed an amended complaint, alleging with 
greater particularity that he satisfied all conditions precedent 
to filing suit under the ADEA.  Specifically, he averred that 
he had filed a timely charge of discrimination, the EEOC had 
issued a right-to-sue letter, and he had filed the complaint 
within 90 days of notice of the right-to-sue.  He attached his 
charge of discrimination and the EEOC right-to-sue letter to 
the amended complaint.   
 
Appellees each filed motions to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
arguing, inter alia, that Hildebrand’s charge was untimely 
because it was filed more than 300 days after the last date of 
discrimination.  Allegheny County also urged the District 
Court to dismiss Hildebrand’s ADEA claim against the 
County on the additional ground that the charge of 
discrimination named only the DA’s Office as a defendant.   
 
 Hildebrand attached to his responses to the motions 
his completed EEOC Intake Questionnaire.  He contended 
that the completed Intake Questionnaire constitutes a charge 
and was filed within 300 days of the last date of 
discrimination.   
 
On January 4, 2013, the District Court dismissed 
Hildebrand’s amended complaint.  The District Court first 
dismissed the ADEA claim, concluding that Hildebrand did 
not file a “charge of discrimination” with the EEOC within 
the requisite 300 days of the last date of discrimination.  
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Specifically, the District Court found that the last date of 
alleged discrimination was Hildebrand’s February 18, 2011 
termination, and that the charge of discrimination filed on 
January 11, 2012 was therefore untimely.  Thus, the District 
Court concluded that Hildebrand failed to sufficiently plead 
that he timely filed his claim with the EEOC “in light of the 
Iqbal/Twombly standard.”  (A. 307.)  Finding that further 
amendment would be futile, the District Court dismissed the 
ADEA claim with prejudice.  
 
As to his § 1983 claims, the District Court held that 
Hildebrand failed to state a plausible claim against Allegheny 
County under a theory of municipal liability, because he did 
not plead sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that 
the County had adopted a custom or practice of age 
discrimination.  The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 
claims against the DA’s Office based on Hildebrand’s 
concession that it was not a separate entity from the County 
for purposes of § 1983.  Finally, having dismissed with 
prejudice all claims arising under federal law, the District 
Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remaining claims asserted under the Pennsylvania 
Whistleblower Law and the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1367.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a 
decision granting a motion to dismiss.  Santiago v. 
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Accordingly, “[w]e may affirm the district court on any 
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ground supported by the record.”  Tourscher v. McCullough, 
184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 
A. Hildebrand’s § 1983 Age Discrimination Claim 
 
 We turn first to Hildebrand’s claim brought under § 
1983 that Appellees discriminated against him on the basis of 
his age, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Allegheny County argues that the 
District Court properly dismissed this § 1983 cause of action, 
contending that “[t]he ADEA ‘is the exclusive remedy for 
claims of age discrimination in employment.’”  (Allegheny 
Cnty. Br. 19 (quoting Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 
555 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2009)).  For the reasons that 
follow, we agree. 
 
1. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
Every person who, under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or 
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other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . . 
 
Rather than conferring any substantive rights, section 
1983 “provides a method for vindicating federal rights 
elsewhere conferred.”  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 
(1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
“Nevertheless, § 1983 is a statutory remedy and Congress 
retains the authority to repeal it or replace it with an 
alternative remedy.”  Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 
(1984), superseded by statute, Education of the Handicapped 
Act, § 615(e)(4) as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4).  Thus, 
“[s]ection 1983 claims are not available . . . where Congress 
has evinced an intent to preclude such claims through other 
legislation.”  Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1055.     
 
In determining whether a statutory enactment 
precludes suit under § 1983, “[t]he crucial consideration is 
what Congress intended.”  Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012.  
Congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims may be 
inferred “[w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular 
Act are sufficiently comprehensive.”  Middlesex Cnty. 
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-
21 (1981).  In Sea Clammers, the Supreme Court held that a 
plaintiff was precluded from bringing a § 1983 suit for 
damages under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976), and 
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976).  453 U.S. at 20-21.  
Emphasizing  the “unusually elaborate enforcement 
provisions” of the statutory framework, id. at 13, the Court 
concluded  that “[a]llowing parallel § 1983 claims to proceed 
. . . would have thwarted Congress’ intent in formulating and 
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detailing these provisions.”  Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. 
Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 253 (2009). 
 
The Supreme Court has also held that § 1983 suits 
were precluded by statute in a case where a plaintiff sought 
vindication of a constitutional – rather than a statutory – right.  
See Smith, 468 U.S. 992.  In Smith, plaintiffs alleged 
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting a deprivation of the 
right to “a free appropriate public education” for their 
handicapped child.  Id. at 1009.  Focusing  once again on the 
“comprehensive nature of the procedures and guarantees” set 
forth in the statute’s remedial scheme, the Court concluded 
that Congress did not intend to “leave undisturbed the ability 
of a handicapped child to go directly to court with an equal 
protection claim to a free appropriate public education.”  Id. 
at 1011.  Permitting such suits, the Court observed, would 
“[a]llow[] a plaintiff to circumvent” congressional intent.  Id. 
at 1012. 
 
Subsequently, in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 
U.S. 113 (2005), the Court again found that a comprehensive 
remedial statutory framework precluded suit under § 1983.  
The plaintiff in Rancho Palos Verdes filed suit under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and for damages under § 
1983.  Id. at 115.  Applying its prior decisions in Sea 
Clammers and Smith, the Court ruled that the 
Telecommunications Act’s remedial scheme would be 
“distort[ed]” by direct enforcement through § 1983.  Id. at 
127. 
 
Most recently, the Court considered whether Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), 
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precludes § 1983 claims of sex discrimination in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.  See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 249.  
In Fitzgerald, the plaintiffs alleged that their daughter, then 
an elementary school student, suffered several incidents of 
sexual harassment by another student while on the school bus, 
and that the school’s response to their allegations had been 
inadequate.  Id. at 250.  The plaintiffs brought suit, asserting 
that their daughter had suffered sex discrimination in 
violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit dismissed plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, 
holding that Title IX provided the sole remedy for sex 
discrimination in the education context.  Id. at 251.  The 
Supreme Court reversed.  Id.  Reiterating that “the crucial 
consideration is what Congress intended,” id. (citation 
omitted),  the Court signaled that its analysis of congressional 
intent might differ depending upon whether the right asserted 
under § 1983 arises from a statute or the Constitution: 
 
In those cases in which the § 1983 
claim is based on a statutory right, 
evidence of such congressional 
intent may be found directly in the 
statute creating the right, or 
inferred from the statute’s 
creation of a comprehensive 
enforcement scheme that is 
incompatible with individual 
enforcement under § 1983.  In 
cases in which the § 1983 claim 
alleges a constitutional violation, 
lack of congressional intent may 
be inferred from a comparison of 
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the rights and protections of the 
statute and those existing under 
the Constitution.  Where the 
contours of such rights and 
protections diverge in significant 
ways, it is not likely that Congress 
intended to displace § 1983 suits 
enforcing constitutional rights. 
 
Id. at 252-53 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
 
Notwithstanding the distinction between statutorily-
created rights and constitutionally-conferred rights, the Court 
emphasized that, “[i]n determining whether a subsequent 
statute precludes enforcement of a federal right under  § 1983 
. . . primary emphasis [is placed] on the nature and extent of 
that statute’s remedial scheme.”  Id.  This was true even 
where plaintiffs, such as those in Smith, “relied on § 1983 to 
assert independent constitutional rights,” rather than statutory 
rights.  Id.  Indeed, the Court observed that in each of the 
cases where it found a statute to be the exclusive remedy for 
an asserted right, “the statutes at issue required plaintiffs to 
comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust 
particular administrative remedies prior to filing suit,” and 
“‘[a]llowing a plaintiff to circumvent’ the statutes’ provisions 
[by suing directly under § 1983] would have been 
‘inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme.’”  Id. 
at 254-55 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012). 
 
Turning to the question of whether Title IX precludes 
suit under § 1983 for sex discrimination, the Court first found 
that Title IX does not provide a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme, emphasizing that Title IX’s “remedies – withdrawal 
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of federal funds and an implied cause of action – stand in 
stark contrast to the ‘unusually elaborate,’ ‘carefully tailored,’ 
and ‘restrictive’ enforcement schemes of the statutes at issue 
in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes.”  Id. at 
255.  The Court observed that Title IX does not contain an 
administrative exhaustion requirement or a notice provision.  
Id. Affording particular weight to Title IX’s lack of an 
express private right of action, the Court noted that it “has 
never held that an implied right of action had the effect of 
precluding suit under § 1983.”  Id.  Given the absence in Title 
IX of a detailed remedial scheme, the Court concluded that 
“parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims will neither 
circumvent required procedures, nor allow access to new 
remedies.”  Id. at 255-56.  The Court found further support 
for its conclusion that gender discrimination covered by Title 
IX could be pursued by way of a § 1983 suit by analyzing 
“the substantive rights and protections guaranteed under Title 
IX and under the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. at 256.  The 
Court found that “Title IX’s protections are narrower in some 
respects and broader in others.”  Id.  For instance, Title IX 
exempts several activities that can be challenged under the 
Equal Protection Clause, such as discrimination in admissions 
decisions of  elementary and secondary schools, and all 
activities of military service schools, as well as traditionally 
single-sex public colleges.  Id. at 257.  Additionally, the 
Court cited incongruous standards for establishing liability 
under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, explaining 
that, while “a Title IX plaintiff can establish school district 
liability by showing that a single school administrator with 
authority to take corrective action responded . . . with 
deliberate indifference,”  the same plaintiff would be required 
to show a municipal policy, custom, or practice under § 1983.  
Id. at 257-58.  Because of this disparity in coverage, as well 
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as Title IX’s lack of a comprehensive enforcement 
framework, the Fitzgerald Court concluded that, in passing 
Title IX, Congress did not intend to preclude sex 
discrimination claims in the context of education under § 
1983.  Id. at 258.   
 
2. 
 
Prior to Fitzgerald, a number of our sister Courts of 
Appeals had held that the ADEA precludes § 1983 claims of 
age discrimination.  See Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057; Tapia-
Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742 (1st Cir. 2003); Migneault v. 
Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated on other 
grounds by Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 
U.S. 1110 (2000); Lafleur v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 
758 (5th Cir. 1997); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315 
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 868 
F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989).  The Seventh Circuit – the only 
Court of Appeals to consider this question after Fitzgerald – , 
however, reached the opposite conclusion.  See Levin v. 
Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (2012).   
 
The leading case concluding that the ADEA precludes 
§ 1983 claims of age discrimination is Zombro v. Baltimore 
City Police Department, 868 F.2d 1364.  See Ahlmeyer, 555 
F.3d at 1056.  In Zombro, the Fourth Circuit held that 
Congress intended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for 
claims of age discrimination, reasoning that private causes of 
action brought directly under § 1983 “would severely 
undermine, if not debilitate, the enforcement mechanism 
created by Congress under the ADEA.”  868 F.2d at 1369.  
Zombro focused on the ADEA’s comprehensive statutory 
scheme, which “was structured to facilitate and encourage 
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compliance through an informal process of conciliation and 
mediation.”  Id. at 1366.  Providing a plaintiff with “direct 
and immediate access to the federal courts” via § 1983 could 
result in “the comprehensive administrative process . . . . 
be[ing] bypassed, and the goal of compliance through 
mediation . . . . be[ing] discarded.”  Id.  Given these concerns, 
the Zombro court reached what it deemed “[t]he inescapable 
conclusion” that the ADEA precludes suits under § 1983 for 
age discrimination.  Id. at 1366-67.   
 
After Zombro, the Courts of Appeals for the First, 
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits agreed.  
See Tapia-Tapia, 322 F.3d at 745; Lafleur, 126 F.3d at 760; 
Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057; Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1140; 
Chennareddy, 935 F.2d at 318.  In light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Fitzgerald, however, the Seventh Circuit 
diverged from this consensus view, concluding instead that 
the ADEA does not preclude constitutional claims of age 
discrimination asserted under § 1983.  Levin, 692 F.3d at 617. 
 
While recognizing that “the ADEA sets forth a rather 
comprehensive remedial scheme,” id. at 618, Levin 
interpreted Fitzgerald as setting a higher bar for inferring 
preclusive intent in cases where a plaintiff alleges a 
constitutional violation.  Id.  To imply congressional intent to 
preclude constitutional claims, the Levin court held that 
“some additional indication of congressional intent” is 
required.  Id. at 619.  Emphasizing that the ADEA lacks 
express language evincing congressional intent to preclude § 
1983 suits, Levin considered the statute’s purpose.  The court 
reasoned that “the ADEA does not purport to provide a 
remedy for violation of constitutional rights,” but rather, “it 
provides a mechanism to enforce only the substantive rights 
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created by the ADEA itself.”  Id. at 619 (citing Zombro, 868 
F.2d at 1373 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Levin 
then distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, 
which found that the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (“IDEA”), Pub. L. 94-142, precluded suit under § 1983 
for a Constitutional violation, explaining that the IDEA was 
passed to address the constitutional requirement to provide a 
public education for handicapped children.  Id. at 619.  
Without express language addressing preclusion, and “absent 
any additional indication from Congress,” the Levin Court 
declined to infer an intent to preclude constitutional claims of 
discrimination.  Id. at 620.  The court in Levin then compared 
the rights and protections offered by the ADEA and the Equal 
Protection Clause, and found several significant differences: 
first, an ADEA plaintiff may sue only an employer, 
employment agency, or labor organization, whereas a § 1983 
plaintiff is free to sue any individual who “caused or 
participated in the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights”; second, the ADEA limits claims by 
certain individuals, such as elected officials, who are not 
exempted from bringing suit under § 1983; and third, unlike 
under § 1983, state employees are effectively barred from 
bringing suit under the ADEA because their employers are 
shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Id. at 621.  In 
light of these differences, and in the absence of express 
congressional intent to the contrary, the Levin court 
concluded that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination claims.  Id. at 621-22. 
 
3. 
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We agree with the Levin court that the issue of whether 
the ADEA precludes a § 1983 cause of action for age 
discrimination in employment presents a “close call.”  Id. at 
617.  Contrary to Levin, however, we conclude that, on 
balance, the relevant considerations weigh in favor of finding 
that the ADEA does indeed bar such § 1983 claims.   
 
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated that the 
comprehensiveness of a statute’s remedial scheme is the 
primary factor in determining congressional intent.  See 
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 253 (“[W]e have placed primary 
emphasis on the nature and extent of [a] statute’s remedial 
scheme.”) (emphasis added).   Fitzgerald reaffirms the 
Court’s jurisprudence on this issue as articulated in Sea 
Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes. Id. at 254 
(observing that, in each of prior cases, “[o]ffering plaintiffs a 
direct route to court via § 1983 would have circumvented [the 
relevant statute’s comprehensive] procedures.”).  Indeed, 
Fitzgerald cited with approval the Court’s statement in Sea 
Clammers that, “[w]hen the remedial devices provided in a 
particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may 
suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the 
remedy of suits under § 1983.”  Id. at 253 (quoting Sea 
Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20) (emphasis added).  To be sure, 
Fitzgerald’s analysis of the different substantive protections 
afforded by Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause provides 
an additional framework for determining whether a section 
1983 cause of action is foreclosed.  Nevertheless, we do not 
believe it disturbed the basic principle that, absent indications 
to the contrary, we may infer that Congress intended to 
preclude § 1983 claims when it provides a sufficiently 
comprehensive remedial scheme for the vindication of a 
federal constitutional right. 
19 
 
 
Thus, we cannot agree with Levin that Congress must 
provide some “additional indication” of its intent.  Levin, 692 
F.3d at 619.  Fitzgerald does not suggest the need for a 
statement of “clear or manifest congressional intent in either 
the language of the statute or the legislative history,” as Levin 
requires.  See Levin, 692 F.3d at 621.  Rather, Fitzgerald 
reaffirmed the principle that, where a statute imposes 
procedural requirements or provides for administrative 
remedies, permitting a plaintiff to proceed directly to court 
via § 1983 would be “inconsistent with Congress’ carefully 
tailored scheme.”  Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith, 
468 U.S. at 1012). 
 
Here, there can be no debate that the ADEA provides a 
comprehensive remedial scheme.  Under the ADEA, it is 
unlawful for an employer to, among other things, “fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 
individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  The ADEA 
expressly provides a private right of action to employees.  Id. 
§ 626(c).  Before an employee may file suit under the ADEA, 
however, a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative 
remedies by filing  a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.  
Id. § 626(d)(1).  The EEOC is then directed to notify all 
respondents named in the employee’s charge of 
discrimination and to “promptly seek to eliminate any alleged 
unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, 
conference, and persuasion.”  Id. § 626(d)(2).  Unless the 
EEOC elects to file suit to enforce the employee’s claim, an 
employee may commence suit sixty days after filing a charge.  
Id. §§ 626(c)(1), (d)(1).  In light of these requirements, we 
agree with the majority of our sister Courts of Appeals that 
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this scheme would be undermined if plaintiffs could sue 
directly under § 1983.  See, e.g., Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366 
(“[Under § 1983, the] plaintiff would have direct and 
immediate access to the federal courts, the comprehensive 
administrative process would be bypassed, and the goal of 
compliance through mediation would be discarded.”). 
 
Moreover, we do not believe that the rights and 
protections of the ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause 
differ in such significant ways as to demonstrate 
congressional intent to allow parallel § 1983 claims alleging 
age discrimination.  The ADEA is intended to “promote 
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than 
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; 
[and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting 
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”  29 
U.S.C. § 621(b).  Under the Equal Protection Clause, age 
classifications receive only rational basis review.  Kimel v. 
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (“States may 
discriminate on the basis of age without offending the 
Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).  By 
prohibiting “arbitrary age discrimination,” the ADEA 
encompasses the protections afforded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, while significantly expanding prohibitions on 
age discrimination elsewhere.   
 
Although, as the Levin court emphasizes, the potential 
defendants are different under the ADEA and § 1983,1 we do 
                                              
1  Under the ADEA, a plaintiff may sue his employer, 
an employment agency, or a labor organization.  29 U.S.C. § 
623.  In contrast, a § 1983 plaintiff can sue an individual 
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not believe this distinction significant enough to demonstrate 
congressional intent to permit both claims.  Additionally, we 
think the fact that certain government employees are either 
exempted from the ADEA, or limited to certain remedies, see 
29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j), 630(f), demonstrates congressional 
intent to specifically define the rights of those employees 
rather than to permit such employees to circumvent these 
limitations by filing directly under § 1983.  See Sea 
Clammers, 453 U.S. at 15 (“In the absence of strong indicia 
of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to 
conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it 
considered appropriate.”). 
 
“We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to 
preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial 
equal protection claim.”  Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012.  Because 
we believe, however, that § 1983 suits are “inconsistent with 
Congress’ carefully tailored scheme,” id., we join the 
majority of Courts of Appeals in concluding that Congress 
intended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for claims of 
age discrimination in employment.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Hildebrand’s § 1983 
claim of age discrimination. 
 
B. Hildebrand’s § 1983 Retaliation Claims 
 
 Hildebrand seeks vindication for two additional 
alleged violations under § 1983, contending that he was 
retaliated against for his use of the internal grievance process 
                                                                                                     
whose actions caused a deprivation of his constitutional 
rights.  Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 555-56 (7th Cir. 
2011).  
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in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that 
he was retaliated against on the basis of his political 
patronage in violation of the First Amendment.  The District 
Court dismissed these allegations along with Hildebrand’s § 
1983 age discrimination claim, finding that he had failed to 
adequately plead that the County adopted a custom or practice 
of such discrimination.  The District Court also found, albeit 
in a footnote, that Hildebrand’s amended complaint “fail[ed] 
to pinpoint with any clarity which of his Constitutional rights 
were negatively impacted by [Allegheny County],” that the 
allegations of First and Fourteenth Amendment violations 
were conclusory in nature, and that they therefore “fail[ed] to 
meet the Iqbal/Twombly standard.”  (A. 313 n.5.)  As to the 
claims of retaliation, we agree with the District Court’s 
analysis. 
 
 Hildebrand brought each of these claims against 
Allegheny County under a theory of municipal liability, 
which requires him to demonstrate either that the County 
officially adopted a “policy,” or unofficially adopted a 
“custom,” of unconstitutional discrimination.  See Monell v. 
Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-
91 (1978).  Hildebrand concededly proceeded on all § 1983 
claims under a “custom” theory.  “A plaintiff may establish a 
custom . . . by showing that a given course of conduct, 
although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so 
well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.”  
Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 155-56 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 
1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 In his amended complaint, Hildebrand made the 
following averments of retaliation: he alleged that he was 
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retaliated against by the Chief Detective and the Assistant 
Chief Detective at the DA’s Office after he made a good faith 
report expressing concerns about a fellow detective (A. 136 
¶¶ S-T); that he was similarly retaliated against by the same 
individuals after reporting a concern about the Office’s 
procedure for charging drug crimes (Id. 138 ¶ X); that he was 
retaliated against by the Assistant Chief Detective after he 
filed an internal grievance against him alleging age-based 
harassment (Id. 139-40 ¶¶ BB – DD); that he was 
subsequently demoted in retaliation for his complaints about 
the drug charging procedures (Id. 142 ¶ JJ); and that he was 
harassed after members of the DA’s Office learned that he 
had previously made political contributions to Joan Orie 
Melvin in her candidacy for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
(Id. 145-46 ¶ WW).  Notwithstanding these allegations of 
retaliation and harassment on the part of certain high-ranking 
officials at the DA’s Office, Hildebrand does not allege that 
Allegheny County established a custom of retaliating against 
supporters of Ms. Melvin, or against Hildebrand or other 
employees who utilized the internal grievance process.   
 
 While Hildebrand’s brief on appeal reasserts his claim 
of retaliation, it does not point to any facts demonstrating that 
there existed a custom in Allegheny County to retaliate 
against employees on these bases.  Rather, the portion of 
Hildebrand’s brief dedicated to discussing his allegations in 
support of municipal liability relate solely to his claims of age 
discrimination.  We therefore agree with the District Court 
that Hildebrand failed to set forth a plausible claim for relief 
against Allegheny County for retaliation, and we will affirm 
their dismissal on that basis. 
 
C. Hildebrand’s ADEA Claims 
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 Having determined that Hildebrand’s § 1983 claims 
were properly dismissed, we now turn to the District Court’s 
dismissal of Hildebrand’s ADEA claim. 
 
1. Whether the Iqbal/Twombly Pleading Standards Apply to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c) 
 
A plaintiff seeking relief under the ADEA must 
exhaust his or her administrative remedies as mandated by 29 
U.S.C. § 626(d).  Section 626(d) requires plaintiffs in 
“deferral states” such as Pennsylvania, which have a state 
agency with authority to investigate claims of employment 
discrimination, to file charges with the EEOC within 300 
days of the last date of alleged discrimination.  29 U.S.C. §§ 
626(d)(2) & 633(b); Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 
851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000).  A plaintiff’s obligation to timely file 
with the EEOC is a condition precedent to filing suit under 
the ADEA.  Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Prods. Co., Div. 
of Litton Sys., Inc., 776 F.2d 56, 64 (3d Cir. 1985) (Sarokin, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 
The pleading of a condition precedent is governed by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c), which provides: 
 
Conditions Precedent.  In 
pleading conditions precedent, it 
suffices to allege generally that all 
conditions precedent have 
occurred or been performed.  But 
when denying that a condition 
precedent has occurred or been 
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performed, a party must do so 
with particularity. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c). 
 
Here, Hildebrand’s original complaint alleged: 
 
All conditions precedent to 
jurisdiction under section 706 of 
Title VII, have occurred or been 
complied with.  Plaintiff filed a 
claim of employment 
discrimination with the [EEOC].  
The EEOC issued a Notice of 
Right to Sue.  This complaint is 
filed within 90 days of such 
Notice of Right to Sue. 
 
 (A. 2.)   
 
The District Court dismissed Hildebrand’s ADEA 
claim, holding that he failed to sufficiently plead the 
satisfaction of this condition precedent.  Specifically, the 
District Court applied the pleading standards set forth in  
Twombly and Iqbal, which held that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to allege “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  
 
 The District Court erred by applying Iqbal and 
Twombly to Hildebrand’s pleading of the conditions 
precedent to filing suit under the ADEA.  Iqbal and Twombly 
interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which 
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governs the standard for pleading a claim for relief.  The 
pleading of conditions precedent is governed by Rule 9(c), 
not Rule 8(a).  Neither Iqbal nor Twombly purport to alter 
Rule 9.  We see no indication that those cases sought to 
override the plain language of Rule 9(c), and we therefore 
conclude that the pleading of conditions precedent falls 
outside the strictures of Iqbal and Twombly.  
 
2. The Intake Questionnaire 
 
 Our conclusion that the District Court erred in 
applying Iqbal and Twombly to the pleading of conditions 
precedent does not end our inquiry.  Following the dismissal 
of his first complaint, Hildebrand filed an amended 
complaint, which alleged his satisfaction of the ADEA’s 
conditions precedent in greater detail.  Specifically, 
Hildebrand alleged that he had filed a charge with the EEOC 
within 300 days of the last date of discrimination.  He 
attached his charge of discrimination to his amended 
complaint. 
 
In their motions to dismiss the amended complaint, 
Appellees contested Hildebrand’s asserted final date of 
discrimination, contending that the last date of discrimination 
was his February 18, 2011 termination.  Under this reasoning, 
Hildebrand’s charge of discrimination, which he filed on 
January 11, 2012, would be untimely.  In response to the 
motions to dismiss, Hildebrand argued that the EEOC Intake 
Questionnaire, which he filed on December 1, 2011, 
constituted a timely-filed charge of discrimination.  
 
The District Court dismissed Hildebrand’s ADEA 
claims with prejudice, concluding that the last date of 
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discrimination was February 18, 2011, and that the January 
11, 2012 charge was therefore untimely.  The District Court 
did not consider the Intake Questionnaire.2  We agree that 
Hildebrand’s Intake Questionnaire constitutes a timely filed 
charge. 
 
 An EEOC filing constitutes a charge of discrimination 
if it satisfies the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6, and can 
“reasonably [be] construed as a request for [the EEOC] to 
take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights.”  Fed. 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008).  In 
Holowecki, the Supreme Court adopted a “permissive” 
interpretation of the charge requirement, explaining that a 
“wide range of documents,”  including an intake 
questionnaire, “may be classified as charges.”  Id. at 402. 
 
                                              
2  Hildebrand concedes that the Intake Questionnaire 
was not attached to his amended complaint.  He did, however, 
submit the questionnaire as an exhibit to his response to 
Allegheny County’s motion to dismiss.  While a court is 
limited to considering the pleadings in deciding a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, we are satisfied that the Intake 
Questionnaire was properly before the District Court.  There 
was no dispute as to its authenticity, and it directly 
corroborated Hildebrand’s claim that he had satisfied the 
conditions precedent to filing suit under the ADEA.  See 
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In 
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only 
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of 
public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if 
the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”).   
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 Following Holowecki, the EEOC revised its Intake 
Questionnaire to require claimants to check a box to request 
that the EEOC take remedial action.  This box, commonly 
referred to as “Box 2,” states:  
 
I want to file a charge of 
discrimination, and I authorize the 
EEOC to look into the 
discrimination I described above.  
I understand that the EEOC must 
give the employer, union, or 
employment agency that I accuse 
of discrimination information 
about the charge, including my 
name. . . .   
 
(A. 262, 291).  Under the revised form, an employee who 
completes the Intake Questionnaire and checks Box 2 
unquestionably files a charge of discrimination.  Hildebrand 
did precisely this.  Additionally, Hildebrand’s questionnaire is 
dated December 1, 2011, which is within 300 days of the 
February 18, 2011 letter of suspension and notice of 
termination.   Thus, it was timely filed.   
 
 The Intake Questionnaire did not, however, preserve 
Hildebrand’s claim against Allegheny County.  As the County 
observes, Hildebrand’s EEOC Intake Questionnaire names 
“Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office” as the only 
respondent.  Thus, it fails to allege any discrimination on the 
part of the County.  We will therefore vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal of Hildebrand’s ADEA claim as to the 
DA’s Office because the Intake Questionnaire was a timely 
filed charge of discrimination, but we will affirm dismissal of 
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the ADEA claim against Allegheny County, because the 
Intake Questionnaire demonstrates that Hildebrand failed to 
timely exhaust his administrative remedies as to the County. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
